When Encryption Is Not Yours: The BitLocker Case and Why This Is Impossible in WeWe Military and Enterprise
The news that Microsoft publicly transferred BitLocker recovery keys under an FBI court order became a landmark case for the entire cybersecurity industry.
the presence of encryption does not automatically mean real control over your own data.
Why This Was Possible in BitLocker
In the case of BitLocker, recovery keys are automatically stored in cloud infrastructure if the user is logged in with a Microsoft account.
This means that the company technically has access to the keys and is legally obligated to provide them upon lawful request. If such technical access exists, it can be abused by corrupt authorities under fabricated criminal cases against businesses or politicians (a practice widely observed in Ukraine), as well as by hired hackers (for example, Russian actors operating in technology and military domains).
It is important to understand: this is not a vulnerability or a mistake — it is a deliberate architectural decision.
The Key Question of Any Encryption System
Who owns the keys, and is there a technical possibility to transfer them?
If the keys:
- are stored by the vendor,
- can be recovered,
- exist in an exportable form,
the scenario of transferring them via a court order or cybercrime is inevitable by definition.
The Fundamental Difference of WeWe Military and WeWe Enterprise
In WeWe Military and WeWe Enterprise models, a completely different approach is used:
- the customer purchases the entire WeWe system and becomes its sole owner;
- servers, infrastructure, and data fully belong to the client;
- the developer or administrator has no architectural access to the system.
How Cryptographic Keys Are Stored in WeWe
The WeWe architecture eliminates the storage of keys in any transferable form:
- private RSA keys are never stored in plaintext;
- each key is encrypted using AES-256;
- the AES key is derived from the user’s PIN via PBKDF2;
- a multi-layer scheme with different salts is used.
Even physical access to servers does not allow retrieval of usable keys without the user’s PIN.
Automatic and Irreversible Data Destruction
- data recovery is technically impossible;
- access cannot be recreated;
- even the infrastructure owner cannot restore the data.
Why “There Is Nothing to Transfer” Is a Technical Fact
- no centralized key storage;
- no master access;
- no recovery mechanism.
Therefore, a BitLocker-like key transfer scenario is architecturally impossible in WeWe Military and Enterprise.
Conclusion
The BitLocker case revealed the limitation of cloud-based key custody.
- full client ownership;
- multi-layer cryptographic protection;
- cryptographic impossibility of third-party access.